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IN REBUTTAL 
I. 
THE STANDARD OF REVIEW IS WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE 
SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL, COMPETENT EVIDENCE. 
With no analysis, Storms and Brownstone proffer that abuse of discretion is the 
applicable standard of review. 1 This is incorrect. As explained in its opening brief, Watkins 
does not challenge the fact of the attorney's fee award. Rather, Watkins argues the district 
court correctly determined that Storms and Brownstone could recover fees incurred in their 
defense of Watkins' claims, but could not recover fees incurred pursuing their counterclaim.2 
More accurately, Watkins challenges the adequacy of the evidence in the record to 
support the district court's finding that 90% of Storms and Brownstone's attorney's fees were 
attributable to their defense of Watkins' claims rather than the pursuit of their counterclaim. 
Because Watkins challenges the district court's finding to support the fee award and not the 
decision to make the award itself, the correct standard of review is whether the findings are 





1 See p. 9 of Brief of Respondents on file herein. 
2 Seep. 3 of Appellant's Brief on Appeal on file herein. 
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THE ISSUE OF THE APPORTIONMENT BETWEEN STORMS AND BROWNSTONE'S RECOVERABLE 
AND UNRECOVERABLE ATTORNEY'S FEES IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT FOR REVIEW. 
On appeal, Watkins challenges the district court's apportionment between recoverable 
and unrecoverable attorney's fees. Storms and Brownstone's primary response is that the 
issue was not properly preserved for appellate review.3 However, a look at the applicable case 
law and the record below establish the issue was properly preserved for this Court's review. 
"To properly raise an issue on appeal there must be either an adverse ruling by the 
court below or the issue must have been raised in the court below." McPheters v. Maile, 138 
Idaho 391, 397 (2003) (citation omitted) (emphasis added); see also Skinner v. U.S. Bank Home 
Mortg., 159 Idaho 642, 650 (2016); Bank of Commerce v. Jefferson Enterprises, LLC, 154 Idaho 
824, 828 (2013); Johannsen v. Utterbeck, 146 Idaho 423, 429 (2008); Garner v. Bartschi, 139 
Idaho 430, 436 (2003). To determine if an issue was properly raised, this Court must 
distinguish "between issues not formally raised [which are nonetheless subject to appellate 
review] and issues that 'never surfaced' below [which are not subject to appellate review]." 
Kolar v. Cassia County Idaho, 142 Idaho 346, 354 (2005) (quotation omitted). "Issues not 
formally raised may be considered if they are tried by the express or implied consent of the 
parties, Idaho R. Civ. P. 15(b) ... " Id. To be considered on appeal, the issue need not be raised 
by formal motion. Manookian v. Blaine County, 112 Idaho 697, 700 {1987). 
3 Seep. 9-13 of Brief of Respondents on file herein. 
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court use exact or to 
an issue on appeal. Rather, the appellant or the trial court need only reference the 
"key language" of the issue. In Moore v. Omnicare, Inc., 141 Idaho 809, 817 (2005), this Court 
observed that the appellant and the district court did not discuss the particular statute argued 
on appeal, but that the district court "sufficiently referenced the key language" of the issue for 
the Court to consider it on appeal. 
Here, the issue Watkins raises on appeal is the propriety of the district court's 
apportionment of Storms and Brownstone's attorney's fees between the defense of Watkins' 
claim, which fees are recoverable, and the pursuit of their counterclaim, which fees are not 
recoverable.4 The district court ruled on this exact issue, adversely to Watkins, concluding that 
90% of the fees were recoverable while only 10% of the fees were not recoverable.5 Because 
the record clearly establishes "an adverse ruling by the court below" on the same issue 
Watkins now challenges on appeal, Watkins 11properly raise[s]" the issue for this Court's review 
on appeal. McPheters, supra, at 397. 
Further, Watkins did raise the issue of recoverabie versus unrecoverable attorney's fees 
to the district court. 6 Watkins went on to argue that Storms and Brownstone were not the 
prevailing parties and that, "[i}n the alternative,"7 the district court should reduce the award, 
4 See pp. 8 and 9-18 of Appellant's Brief on Appeal on file herein. 
5 R Vol. I, pp. 233-234. 
6 R Vol. I, pp. 210-213. 
7 R Vol. I, p. 217. 
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court 
for pursuing counterclaim. course, Watkins did not 
initially challenge the correctness of the district court's apportionment of the fees because the 
district court had not yet made any apportionment. However, after the district court ruled 
adversely to Watkins on this issue, the matter became ripe for appellate review. Again, the 
issue need not be "formally raised." Kolar, supra. 
Idaho case law is replete with cases where the appellant attempts to impermissibly 
raise a completely new issue on appeal where there is no mention of the issue, statute, or rule 
anywhere in the record below. But here, the fact that Watkins challenges the district court's 
finding, which finding is set forth in the record, establishes that the district court addressed the 
issue below, ruled adversely to Watkins, and that this Court may now properly review the issue 
on appeal. Clearly, the district court usufficiently referenced the key language," Moore, supra, 
of the attorney's fee apportionment issue when it found that 90% of the fees were 
recoverable. Thus, as Watkins raised and the district court ruled adversely on the issue, this 
Court may properly consider the issue on appeal. 
For their part, Storms and Brownstone do not discuss the law that an issue may be 
preserved for appeal by the adverse ruling of the district court on the issue. They do not cite it 
at all. 
Instead, Storms and Brownstone challenge whether the appellant sufficiently raised the 
issue below by attempting to frame the issue as narrowly as possible in hopes that this Court 
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not Storms Inc. 
Flats Park, Idaho 624 (2016), requiring that the issue be specifically 
below, but Fagen is easily distinguished from the present case. In Fagen, the appellant raised 
an entirely new argument on appeal, challenging the reasonableness of the rate charged by 
counsel from Minnesota, an issue the appellant did not raised below and that the court did not 
rule upon. Here, Watkins challenged Storms and Brownstone's right to recover fees for 
pursuing their counterclaim and the district court ruled adversely to Watkins by finding 90% of 
the total fees were recoverable. 
Likewise, Storms and Brownstone's reliance on Tapadeera, LLC v. Knowlton, 153 Idaho 
182 {2012), is inapposite. Tapadeera contended on appeal that the district court erred in 
failing to award it attorney fees under Idaho Code Section 12-120(1), but Tapadeera had not 
requested that award from the district court, so this Court refused to consider the request on 
appeal. As Tapadeera had not ever made the request to the district court, the district court 
had made no ruling on the issue, and there was no decision for Tapadeera to challenge on 
appeal. Id. at 188. Here, the district court found that 90% of Storms and Brownstone's fees 
were recoverable, a finding made by the district court that Watkins now challenges. There was 
no record below of Tapadeera's request, so the Court properly refused to consider the request 
on appeal. But here, there is a record below addressing the issue Watkins now challenges, so 
the Court may properly review it on appeal. 
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475 is inapplicable the same reason as Tapadeera. appellant in Inland argued 
on appeal that an affidavit in support of a motion for order to show cause was defective, but 
the appellant had not raised that issue below and the trial court had not ruled on it. Here, 
Watkins raised the issue of unrecoverable attorney's fees and the district court ruled on the 
issue by apportioning 90% of Storms and Brownstone's fees to the recoverable claim. Thus, 
Inland does not apply here. 
Clearly, the district court ruled adversely to Watkins on the very issue that Watkins now 
asserts on appeal when the district court apportioned 90% of Storms and Brownstone's total 
attorney's fees to the recoverable portion of the case (i.e., the defense of Watkins' claim) and 
only 10% to the unrecoverable portion of the case (i.e., Storms and Brownstone's 
counterclaim). 
111. 
STORMS AND BROWNSTONE'S REMAINING ARGUMENTS ARE INAPPOSITE. 
Other than arguing that Watkins has not properly preserved its issue for appeal, Storms 
and Brownstone offer no substantive opposition. They do argue, without citation to any 
authority, that this Court "clearly" can award Storms and Brownstone those attorney's fees 
incurred prior to Storms and Brownstone filing their counterclaim.8 However, the facts giving 
rise to Storms and Brownstone's counterclaim all arose at the commencement of the case in 
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to Just not 
file their counterclaim October 23, 2013, does not excuse their failure to distinguish 
between recoverable and unrecoverable attorney's fees. Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 
Idaho 72 (1996). This is especially true when Storms and Browstone's billings show work on 
the counterclaim as early as February 25, 2013,9 eight months before they actually filed the 
counterclaim. Without a meaningful segregation in the affidavit of counsel and memorandum 
of costs, the district court was left to impermissibly guess whether Storms and Brownstone 
incurred their fees in defense of Watkins' claim or in pursuit of their counterclaim. 
Storms and Brownstone also suggest that their failure to distinguish the fees they 
incurred defending Watkins' claims from pursuing their counterclaim is excused because the 
district court correctly considered the factors of Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54(e)(3) and 
made a "reasonable" award.10 However, Watkins does not complain of the district court's 
application of the Rule 54(e)(3) factors, but of the dearth of evidence to support the district 
court's finding that 90% of Storms and Brownstone's fees related to the defense of Watkins' 
claim. Thus, Storms and Brownstone are refuting an argument that Watkins never made. 
Storms and Brownstone's reliance on the district court's application of Rule 54(e)(3) and the 
overall "reasonableness" of the district court's award is unavailing. 
8 See p. 13 of Brief of Respondents on file herein. 
9 R Vol. I, p. 199. 
10 See pp. 14-17 of Brief of Respondents on file herein. 
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on Freeman & Co. v. 
the proposition that a percentage-based split attorney's fees is permissible. This 
is true within the context of a prevailing party analysis as in Freeman where the party is 
allowed to recover fees on all claims and the only question is the extent to which that party 
prevailed. This is what the trial court did in Freeman. However, Freeman does not address the 
issue in this case, namely the apportionment of attorney's fees between a claim for which fees 
are recoverable and a claim for which fees are not recoverable. Freeman does not lend any 
support to Storms and Brownstone's failure to identify which of their fees were attributable to 
Watkins' defense and which were attributable to the pursuit of their counterclaim. In fact, 
Storms and Brownstone's suggested interpretation of Freeman is directly contrary to the rule 
set forth in Brooks v. Gigray Ranches, Inc., 128 Idaho 72 (1996); Advanced Medical Diagnostics, 
LLC, v. Imaging Center of Idaho, LLC, 154 Idaho 812, 815 (2013); Weaver v. Searle Bros., 129 
Idaho 497 (1996); Rockefeller v. Grabow, 136 Idaho 637 (2001); Devine v. Cluff, 110 Idaho 1 
(Ct.App. 1986); and the other sources Watkins cites in support of its argument. 
The district court acknowledged that "Storms and Brownstone did not clarify the 
precise amount of time devoted to their counterclaim,"11 but nonetheless tried to justify its 
award by estimating that "[n]ot more than ten percent (10%) ... pertained to Storms' and 
Brownstone's counterclaim" 12 and that it spent "approximately ten percent" of its written 
11 R Vol. I, p. 234. 
12 R Vol. I, p. 234. 
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is 
court committed reversible error because was no substantial, evidence in 
record to support the court's finding. 
IV. 
THIS COURT SHOULD AWARD WATKINS ITS ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS AS THE PREVAILING 
PARTY ON APPEAL 
Watkins reiterates its request for an award of attorney's fees and costs on appeal 
pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 41(a); Idaho Appellate Rule 40; BECO Const. Co., Inc. v. J-U-8 
Engineers Inc., 149 Idaho 294, 298 (2010); and Idaho Code Section 12-120(3). As Watkins 
challenges the amount of the district court's fee award, if Watkins prevails on appeal, the Court 
should award Watkins its attorney's fees and costs. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein and in the Appellant's Brief, this Court should grant 
Watkins all relief requested in the Appellant's Brief. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this -2..J:-day of July, 2016. 
13 R Vol. I, p. 234. (Italics in original.) 
APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL 
SM 1TH, DRISCOLL & ASSOCIATES, PLLC 
By: -,,,.a:&_~rk~~ ....... -~'------
'j(J~Drlscoll 
Attorneys for Appellant, 
The Watkins Company, LLC 
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HEREBY CERTIFY that on this day July, 2016, I caused a true and correct 
copy of the foregoing APPELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL to be served, by placing the same 
in a sealed envelope and depositing it in the United States Mai!, postage prepaid, or hand 
delivery, facsimile transmission or overnight delivery, addressed to the following: 
Dean C. Brandstetter, Esq. 
COX, OHMAN & 
BRANDSTETTER,CHTD 
P.O. Box 51600 
510 "D" Street 
Idaho Falls, ID 83405 
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